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War Through Pharmaceuticals: 
How Terrorist Organizations are 
Turning to Counterfeit Medicine 
to Fund Their Illicit Activity 
Douglas T. Cannon1 
The current international framework is ill equipped to 
proactively handle the growing threat terror organizations play 
on the international pharmaceutical industry. Globally, there 
lacks a true enforcement mechanism that can both proactively 
thwart these offenses, but also retroactively prosecute the 
offenders. Our typical image of terrorism is a group of masked 
men opening fire on a crowded area, or detonating improvised 
explosive devices to harm hundreds or thousands of innocent 
civilians. But what if terrorists became so advanced that they 
were able to harm millions, without their targets ever knowing? 
Imagine taking over-the-counter pain medication to relieve your 
horrible sinus pressure, but unbeknownst to you, that medicine 
had been tainted with Cyanide. While that example is horribly 
graphic—it is a real example of what many call a chilling display 
of domestic terrorism. Similarly, what if that generic Viagra 
being sold was secretly produced by Hizballah and used to 
finance its ongoing terror operations globally. Experts have 
warned the pharmaceutical industry that they are vulnerable to 
terror threats, little has pragmatically been done. This Note 
proposes a new International Task Force, which will have both 
the authority to seek out these offenders, use force – if needed- 
to take down these groups, a database to organize this 
information, and finally, a Treaty establishing counterfeit 
medicine as a crime. While many Notes detail international 
responses to terrorism, or global responses to pharmaceuticals, 
no Note has yet to combine the two very real issues. Providing 
exposure to this issue, this Note will provide for a unique plan 
to impede these offenders.  
“The price of freedom is eternal vigilance.” – Thomas Jefferson 
 
 
 
1. Managing Editor, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law; 
B.A., Washington & Jefferson College (2012); J.D. Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law (expected 2015).  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the post-9/11 world, terrorist groups are becoming ever more 
resourceful in discovering novel techniques to increase funding.2 One 
such way is the manufacturing and distributing of counterfeit drugs.3 
As one author noted, “[c]ounterfeiting is a serious problem that 
transcends law enforcement…and clearly has entered the realm of 
terrorism.”4 While others have written about how terror groups 
finance their operations vis-à-vis the exchange of narcotics, this Note 
 
2. See Matthew Levitt, Political Hardball Within Hamas: Hardline 
Militants Calling Shots in Gaza, WASH. INST. (Jan. 6, 2009), http:// 
www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/political-hardball-
within-hamas-hardline-militants-calling-shots-in-gaza. 
3. See Hezbollah Tries to Use Counterfeit Medications as a Terrorist 
Weapon, MISSING PEACE (Jun. 3, 2013), http://missingpeace.eu/ en/ 
2013/06/hezbollah-tries-to-use-counterfeit-medications-as-a-terrorist-
weapon/. 
4. Jay Fraser, Counterfeiting—A Matter of National Security, THREATS 
WATCH, http:// threatswatch.org/rapidrecon/2008/05/counterfeiting-a-
matter-of-nat/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
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will focus on the illegal production, and sale of pharmaceutical 
medication, commonly referred to as “Counterfeit Medicine.”5 As part 
of the larger issue of counterfeiting, the World Health Organization 
(“WHO”) in 2006 launched the International Medical Products Anti-
Counterfeiting Taskforce (“IMPACT”) to “build coordinated 
networks across and between countries in [o]rder to halt the 
production, trading and selling of fake medicines around the globe.”6  
In analyzing the issue of Counterfeit Medicine, its funding of 
terror, and IMPACT’s mission, it is first important to understand 
how terror financing has changed in the last decade. Accordingly, 
Part II of this Note provides a background of this issue, focusing on 
the terror aspects as they relate to counterfeit medicine. This section 
focuses on well-known terror groups and their methods of funding. In 
addition, this section lays the framework for an analysis in the final 
section detailing a method of preventing these groups from using 
counterfeit medicine to further proliferate their terror activity. Part 
III analyzes the current framework of counterfeit medicine. It explores 
which markets have been affected; who, in the international 
community, has the authority to act, and who is acting. Part III 
analyzes the efficacy of the United States government and other 
countries’ task forces in combatting counterfeit medicine, as well as 
the WHO and their unit- IMPACT. Finally, Part IV provides a 
critique and a discussion of a possible solution to combating this 
problem: instituting an international anti-counterfeiting task force 
akin to the International Anti-Poaching Foundation. 
 
5. See Counterfeit Medicine, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http:// 
www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicin
eSafely/CounterfeitMedicine/default.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2013) 
(defining counterfeit medicine as “fake medicine[, that] may be 
contaminated or contain the wrong or no active ingredient. They 
could have the right active ingredient but at the wrong dose. 
Counterfeit drugs are illegal and may be harmful to [one’s] health.”). 
6. IMPACT: International Medicine Products Anti-Counterfeiting 
Taskforce, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/impact/about/ 
en/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
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II. BACKGROUND- TERROR GROUPS, THEIR FUNDING, AND 
COUNTERFEIT MEDICINE 
Terrorism is defined as “the use of violence and threats to 
intimidate or coerce.”7 While terrorism is not a recent phenomenon, 
largely, since the 1980s it has threatened Western existence.8 In 
modernity, terrorism has greatly evolved into complex organizations 
fighting for a common cause. While there is yet to be an organization 
focused solely on counterfeiting medicine, many current terror 
organizations have dabbled in this area. The following provides 
background into the designation of a terror group, how they receive 
funding, and how these designation’s and funding factors relate to 
counterfeit medicine. 
A. Terror Groups—A Primer 
The U.S. Department of State champions a list of policy 
determinations and classifications defining a Foreign Terror 
Organization (“FTO”).9 In this capacity, the Secretary of State, in 
accordance with §219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”) designates the group(s) to be added to this list.10 Section 219 
of the INA states that for an organization to be listed:  
 
7. Terrorism, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ 
terrorism (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). 
8. See generally J.M.B. Porter, Osama bin Laden, Jihād, and the Sources 
of International Terrorism, 13 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 871, 876 
(explaining how in Osama Bin Laden’s view, the Christian Crusades 
were no different than Islamic terror of today). 
9. See Office of The Coordinator For Counterterrorism, Chapter 6. Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations, U.S. STATE DEP’T., http://www.state.gov/ 
j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195553.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2013). It is worth 
noting that the FTO is not the only list that the U.S. government 
employs in its aim to define terror organizations. See e.g., section 6(j) of 
the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. § 2405(j) et seq., 
available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/sdn/index.html. In 
addition to the lists the U.S. government employs, there is a multitude 
of lists compiled by the international community. See e.g., S.C. Res 
1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000); S.C. Res. 1390, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 
(Jan. 28, 2002); S.C. Res. 1455, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1455 (Jan. 17, 2003). 
For a list of individuals and organizations classified by the EU as terror 
organizations see L 340/64 23.12.2005, available at http://eurlex. 
europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_340/l_34020051223en0064006
6.pdf. 
10. See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 8; see also INA: Act 
219—Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organization, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMM. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/ ilink/docView/ 
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1.It must be a foreign organization. 
2.The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined 
in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)), 
or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 
U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)), or retain the capability and intent to 
engage in terrorist activity or terrorism. 
3.The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must 
threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security 
(national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of 
the United States.11 
Currently, according to the Department of State, there are over 
forty-five groups listed.12 These groups include, Hizballah,13 Abu 
Sayyaf Group, Al-Shabaab, Al-Qa’ida (and their derivations) as well 
as non-Islamic groups such as the Real IRA.14 Both Hizballah and the 
Real IRA have been linked to counterfeiting medicine, and as such, a 
brief history of each will be explored.15  
 
SLB/HTML/SLB/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-29/0-0-0-5017.html (last visited Apr. 1, 
2015) [hereinafter INA Act 219]. 
11. See INA Act 219, supra note 9. 
12. The State Department updates the list of foreign terror organizations 
yearly, and changes are additionally made as Congress updates its 
statutes. Organizations can challenge their FTO designation by filing a 
petition for revocation two years after the designation date (or in the 
case of redesignated FTOs, its most recent redesignation date) or two 
years after the determination date on its most recent petition for 
revocation. The moving party, to successfully overcome this challenge, 
must provide material evidence that the basis for the FTO designation 
warrants such a removal of said designation. Additionally, if no 
challenge is made within five years of placing an organization on the 
FTO list, the Secretary of State is required to conduct a review to 
determine the appropriateness of the designation. See Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 
1011(a), 118 Stat. 3638.; see Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra 
note 8 (at the time of writing this Note, Department of State lists 49 
groups as TFO). 
13. Hizballah is also commonly referred to as Hezbollah. 
14. See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 8 (at the time of 
writing this Note, Department of State lists 49 groups as FTO). 
15. NICHOLAS RIDLEY, TERRORIST FINANCING: THE FAILURE OF COUNTER 
MEASURES 127 (2012); see also Hezbollah Tries to Use Counterfeit 
Medications as a Terrorist Weapon, MISSING PEACE, http:// 
missingpeace. eu/ en/ 2013/ 06/ hezbollah-tries-to-use-counterfeit-
medications-as-a-terrorist-weapon (last visited Nov. 10, 2013). 
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1. Hizballah 
Hizballah received its FTO designation in October of 1997.16 The 
Department of State characterizes Hizballah as a radical Shia based 
group, which takes its ideological inspiration from the Ayotollah 
Kohmeini.17 Hizballah is often termed the “long arm of Iran.”18 Most 
recently, the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon indicted members of 
Hizballah for the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-
Hariri, killed by a car bomb in Beirut in 2005.19  
2. Real Irish Republican Army (Real IRA) 
The Real IRA received its FTO designation in May of 2001 after 
forming in 1997 with the express purpose of “removing British forces 
from Northern Ireland and unifying Ireland.”20 Located in Northern 
Ireland, the Real IRA is a paramilitary group whose purpose is to 
reunite “Ireland’s 32 counties under an independent Republic of 
Ireland.”21 It is now believed the RIRA is splintering, focusing more 
on soft targets while attempting to regroup.22 Most recently, in March 
2013, local authorities foiled an attempted mortar attack by RIRA.23 
 
16. See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 8. 
17. Id. 
18. See Iran & Hezbollah Axis of Terror—A Worldwide Threat, IDF BLOG 
(Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.idfblog.com/hezbollah/2013/10/08/iran-
hezbollah-axis-terror-worldwide-threat/; see also Attila Somflavi, 
Official: Hezbollah Attack More Dangerous than Iran Missiles, YNET 
NEWS (Jun. 8, 2012), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-
4265026,00.html. 
19. See Leena Saidi and David Stout, Huge Car Bomb Kills Lebanon’s 
Former Prime Minister, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2005), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2005/02/14/international/14cnd-beirut.html; see also 
Martin Chulov, UN Court Indicts Four Hezbollah Members Over Hariri 
Car Bomb, GUARDIAN (Jun. 30, 2011) http://www. theguardian. 
com/world/2011/jun/30/lebanon-indicts-hezbollah-hariri-car-bomb; see 
also The Prosecutor v. Mustafa Amine Badreddine, Salim Jamil Ayyash, 
Hussein Hassan Oneissi & Assad Hassan Sabra, Case No. STL-11-
01/I/PTJ, Indictment (Jun. 10, 2011), http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-
cases/stl-11-01/main/filings/indictments/f0007. 
20. Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 8. 
21. Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), START: NAT’L. CONSORTIUM FOR 
STUDY TERRORISM & RESPONSES TO TERRORISM , http:// www. start. 
umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp
?id=91 (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) 
22. Id.; Compare, e.g., Scott Stewart, The Persistent Threat to Soft 
Targets, STRATFOR GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE (Jul. 26, 2012), http:// 
www.stratfor.com/weekly/persistent-threat-soft-targets. 
23. Chris Buckler, Londonderry Mortar Bomb Attack Averted, BBC (Mar. 
4, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-21656775. 
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B. Terrorist Financing 
The prevention of terrorist financing since 9/11 has proved to be 
quite daunting.24 One reason is that some of these funds are smuggled 
via legitimate business networks and charities.25 The U.S. government 
is adamant about “starving the terrorists of funding and shutting 
down the institutions that support or facilitate terrorism.”26 As of 
2005, the U.S. government has frozen nearly $200 million in terrorist 
funds, though over 80% were frozen the first few months after 9/11.27 
Since this time, the U.S., in concert with 36 other countries, organized 
the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (“FATF”).28 
The prime directive of FATF is to adopt a uniform set of standards 
regarding money laundering and terrorist financing, that encourage an 
effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures 
for these actions which pose a threat to our financial systems.29 
 
24. Laura K. Donohue, Anti-Terrorist Finance in the United Kingdom and 
United States, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 303, 304 (2006); see also MARTIN A. 
WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21902, TERRORIST FINANCING: THE 
9/11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 3 (2005). 
25. John Roth et. al, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States: Monograph on Terrorist Financing 4, available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Mon
ograph.pdf; see also Judith Miller and Jeff Gerth, A Nation Challenged: 
Al Qaeda; Hone Trade Said to Provide Funds and Cover to bin Laden, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/11/ 
world/nation-challenged-al-qaeda-honey-trade-said-provide-funds-cover-
bin-laden.html (stating that American officials have evidence that AQ’s 
$ is coming from shops that sell honey); see also Amelia Hill, Bin 
Laden’s $20m African ‘Blood Diamond’ Deals, GUARDIAN (Oct. 19, 
2012) http://www.theguardian.com /world/ 2002/ oct/20/ alqaida. 
terrorism. 
26. Statement of Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill on Signing of Executive 
Order Authorizing the Treasury Department to Block Funds of 
Terrorists and their Associates, (Sept. 24, 2001). 
27. WEISS, supra note 23, at 1. 
28. The FATF members are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, 
Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, People’s Republic of China, Portugal, Russian 
Federation, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States; the two 
international organizations are the European Commission, and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council. There are also an array of international 
organizations and countries with “observer status.” For more 
information see FATF Members and Observers, FIN. ACTION TASK 
FORCE (2014), http:// www. fatf-gafi. org/ pages/ aboutus/ 
membersandobservers/. 
29. Who We Are, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE (2014), http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/aboutus/whoweare/. 
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Though lacking an enforcement mechanism, countries voluntarily 
agree to the following conditions, promulgated by FATF, in order to 
receive membership: 
(1) [B]e fully committed at the political level to implement the 
40 recommendations within a reasonable time frame (three 
years) and to undergo annual self-assessment exercises and two 
rounds of mutual evaluations; (2) be a full and active member 
of the relevant FATF-style regional body; (3) be a strategically 
important country; (4) have already made the laundering of the 
proceeds of drug trafficking and other serious crimes a criminal 
offense; and (5) have already made it mandatory for financial 
institutions to identify their customers and to report unusual or 
suspicious transactions.30 
The recommendations of FATF have been adopted by the UN,31 
and affirmed by the G-20 in their annual conferences located in 
Pittsburgh, Seoul, and Cannes.32 While unable to actively enforce 
their regulations—due to a lack of proper regulating body, and no 
true enforcement mechanism—FATF has made meaningful progress 
since its inception.33  
Before delving into how this illicit money is raised, and what is 
being done to thwart that fundraising, it is prudent to understand 
what the money raised is used for, and just how little money is truly 
needed to organize and create the chaos on which these organizations 
thrive, thus exhibiting the great impact the sale of counterfeit 
medicine has.34 The funding of terrorist organizations can generally be 
categorized into two general categories: operational costs, and 
organizational costs.35  
 
30. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21904, THE FINANCIAL 
ACTION TASK FORCE: AN OVERVIEW 1. 
31. See S.C. Res. 1617, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (Jul. 29, 2005). 
32. See generally Cannes Summit Final Declaration—Building on Our 
Common Future: Renewed Collective Action for the Benefit of All, 
UNIV. TORONTO G20 INFO. CTR. (Nov. 4, 2011), http:// 
www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-cannes-declaration-111104-en.html 
[hereinafter G-20 Cannes]. 
33. Jackson, supra note 29, at 4 (showing that since its inception, only two 
countries have been deemed “non-cooperative countries” [North Korea 
and Iran] and sixteen countries where progress is still needed to meet 
the mutual cooperativeness FATF seeks [Cuba, Bolivia, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, São Tomé and 
Príncipe, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, and Turkey]). 
34. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, TERRORIST FINANCING 4 (2008) at 4, available 
at http:// www.fatf-gafi.org/ media/ fatf/ documents/ reports/ 
FATF%20Terrorist%20Financing%20Typologies%20Report.pdf. 
35. Id at 7.  
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1. Operational Costs 
The amount of money needed to carry out an attack varies based 
on a multitude of factors, some of which include: location, method, 
and personnel. An indication of the estimated costs of attacks can be 
detailed in the following table: 
 
Analyzing the table, it is apparent that the relative cost of 
financing a terror operation is quite low vis-à-vis the yield for injury.36 
In just two attacks, the infamous London Tube and Madrid Train 
bombings, nearly 2400 individuals were injured, and over 210 lost 
their lives.37 Counter that figure with the combined expenditure to 
carry out the attack, roughly a mere $14,00038 and it is quite apparent 
why tracking and stopping these small monetary operations becomes 
quite tricky.39 Other operational costs include per diems to the 
martyrs, communication protocols, and training.40 Quantifying 
 
36. Compare e.g. 7 July Bombings, BBC NEWS (2011), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/london_blasts/what_hap
pened/html/russell_sq.stm (claiming 26 deaths and 340 injuries) with 
The Ruling Excludes ETA Condems Zougam Trashorras and El-Gnaoui 
and acquits “The Egyptian,” LA VERDAD, http://especiales. 
laverdad.es/juicio-11m/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2013) (asserting that 192 
casualties and 2050 injuries); see also Indictment of Spanish Bombers, 
Sumario N 20/2004 (Jul. 5, 2006) available at http:// 
www.elmundo.es/documentos/2006/04/11/auto_11m.html. 
37. See 7 July Bombings, supra note 36; see LA VERDAD, supra note 26. 
38. See 2005 FX Daily Forex Rates U.S. Dollar £ GBP € Euro, TAX FREE 
GOLD http://taxfreegold.co.uk/2005forexrates.html (last visited Apr. 1, 
2015). 
39. See Robin Finn, Cutting Off Terror’s Money Supply, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
17, 2007, at B4 (comparing going after the small money operations to 
“trying to shut down the phone company by going to people’s homes 
and apartments and individually smashing their phones instead of 
destroying the satellites and cables that conduct the signals.”)  
40. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 33 at 8.  
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training to expense per operation can be quite perplexing.41 
Quantifying an exact amount is nearly impossible, though it may be 
less than one would think if groups with similar ideologies share the 
brunt of expenses.42 
2. Organizational Costs 
Beyond the assumed costs of running a clandestine operation, 
recruitment, planning, and procurement represent the largest tranche 
of necessary financial resources.43 Take, for example, Hamas. Hamas 
has a tripartite structure composed of a social welfare branch, a 
political branch, and a military division.44 Funding for these 
operations can be quite burdensome.45 While some of the military 
division’s costs can be accounted for under the operational category, 
such as guerilla and terrorist activities, the public face of the Hamas, 
though formally a FTO, engenders many other expenses. Roughly 
50% of Hamas’ annual budget (nearly $450 million) is dedicated to 
these operating expenses.46 While Hamas stands as an outlier47- it is 
estimated that Hizballah’s operating budget is around $200-$500 
million with roughly $100 million coming from the Iranian 
government.48 Further, as of 2011, the Taliban was estimated to take 
in approximately $560 million annually,49 and the UN revealed that 
 
41. See TERRORIST FIN. STAFF, NAT’L COMM. ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON 
U.S., AL QAEDA’S MEANS AND METHODS TO RAISE, MOVE, AND USE 
MONEY 19, available at http://govinfo.library. unt.edu/911/ 
staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Ch2.pdf (estimating overhead at 
approximately $30m for all). 
42. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 33 at 8. 
43. Id.  
44. Levitt, supra note 1. 
45. See Omar Shaban, Hamas Budget a Small Step Toward Transparency, 
AL-MONITOR (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.al-monitor.com/ pulse/ 
iw/contents/articles/opinion/2013/01/hamas-budget-transparency.html 
(noting that until 2007 funding of Hamas equaled roughly $4-5m per 
month). 
46. Id. 
47. Besides being a radical terror organization, Hamas is also the controlling 
government in the Gaza Strip. See Gaza Strip, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ 
gz.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
48. See Hezbollah, DISCOVER THE NETWORK, http://www. 
discoverthenetworks.org/printgroupProfile.asp?grpid=6256 (last visited 
Jan. 21, 2014). 
49. See The World’s 5 Richest Terrorist Groups, MONEY JIHAD, 
http://moneyjihad.wordpress.com/2011/08/29/the-worlds-5-richest-
terrorist-groups/ (Aug. 29, 2011).  
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$70-$100 million is approximately al-Shabaab’s revenues.50 Compare 
those figures with estimates recently from Forbes, and other outlets, 
that estimate al Qaeda is actually bankrupt.51 Due to continued 
constraints on its funding pipeline by the U.S. and allies, “al Qaeda’s 
home office [is] no longer able to subsidize operations.”52 
3. How Do Terrorists Finance Their Operations? 
Unlike normal businesses, terror organizations do not have the 
luxury of simply using earned income, or revenue, to finance their 
counterfeiting operations directly. This is due to a few reasons, the 
last of which is United States Federal banking law.53 Instead, there 
are two main categories that define how terror groups fundraise: 
moving money, and earning money. This section will analyze the ways 
in which terror organizations move and earn their money. 
a. Moving Money 
The process in which terrorists, or other nefarious persons, turn 
dirty/tainted money—obtained from their less than legal activities—
into “clean” usable money is known as laundering.54  
Terrorists launder ‘clean’ money by moving and storing it for 
the purposes of financing training and future operations. The 
lack of physical evidence in mobile transactions, and the ability 
to easily move and store money through various New Payment 
Methods, should be of great concern to the law enforcement 
community.55 
There are a few forms of “moving money” that the terror 
organizations can employ. A classical Islamic law, dating back to the 
 
50. See Barbara Starr, U.N. Report: Al-Shabaab is Raising Millions Illegally 
in Somalia, CNN, http://edition.cnn.com/2011/ WORLD/ africa/ 
08/05/somalia.al.shabaab.report/ (Aug. 5, 2011). 
51. See Nathan Vardi, Is Al-Qaeda Bankrupt?, FORBES http:// 
www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0301/terrorism-funds-finance-osama-al-
qaeda-bankrupt.html (Feb. 21, 2010); see also Bruce Watson, Is Al 
Qaeda Bankrupt? Authorities Cripple Group by Cutting Off Money 
Supply, DAILYFINANCE, http://www.dailyfinance.com/ 2010/02/14/ 
authorities-are-crippling-al-qaeda-by-cutting-off-its-money-supp/ (Feb. 
14, 2010); Compare with Stephen Gandel, Will Osama’s Death Bankrupt 
al-Qaeda?, TIME, http://business.time.com/ 2011/05/02/will-osamas-
death-bankrupt-al-qaeda/ (May 2, 2011). 
52. Vardi, supra note 51. 
53. See 18 U.S.C § 1956. 
54. See Jenni Hesterman, Mobile Payments a New Way for Terrorists and 
Criminals to Move Money, IN HOMELAND SECURITY, 
http://inhomelandsecurity.com/mobile_payments_a_new_way_for/. 
55. Id. 
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8th century, dictates a form of transferring money known as Hawala.56 
Formally, “Hawala is an alternative or parallel remittance system” 
which operates outside, or occasionally parallel to traditional western 
banking systems.57 What makes Hawala so difficult to track and 
prevent is the complicated manner in which Hawala transactions 
occur. There are no receipts, the bookkeeping is in aggregate, not in 
terms of individual remittances, and while money changes hands 
domestically, the passing of funds internationally is not quite as 
obvious.58 In many cases, the money does not need to transfer from 
broker to fulfiller as the fulfiller can be simply repaying a current 
debt.59 Because of these “off the book” dealings, tracking is near 
impossible unless wiretaps are used or tracking systems are in place to 
monitor couriers. As such, a key attractiveness to Hawala is 
anonymity.60 Since 9/11, the United States and other governments 
have been on particularly high alert for illicit trading via Hawala 
networks, in some cases shutting down networks, and/or issuing 
sanctions, or advisory statements.61 But, while many Western 
countries are increasingly suspicious of Hawala transactions, a large 
portion of the Western world still allows for Hawala transactions.62  
With the increased prevalence of new and novel payment 
methods, at least one analyst believes “[w]e do not have another year 
to waste.”63 In the digital age, it is increasingly difficult to “follow the 
 
56. See Patrick M. Jost, The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and its 
Role in Money Laundering, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/ 
Documents/FinCEN-Hawala-rpt.pdf at 15. 
57. Id at 5. 
58. Id at 7.  
59. Id. 
60. Id at 9. For a more thorough examination of the ramifications of Hawala 
in regards to money laundering see id. at 12–13.  
61. See United States v. Banki, 2010 WL 1459442 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2010) 
(analyzing whether Hawala transactions to Iran violated U.S. sanctions 
against Iran); see also Informal Value Transfer Systems, FIN. CRIMES 
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (Sept. 1, 2010), http:// www.fincen.gov/ 
statutes_regs/guidance/html/FIN-2010-A011.html, (examining the 
issues with Hawala or informal value transfer systems). 
62. See e.g., WORLD BANK & INT’L MONETARY FUND, INFORMAL FUNDS 
TRANSFER SYSTEMS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMAL HAWALA SYSTEM 
33-40 (2003) (explaining the variety of countries which regulate, 
administrate, and ban Hawala financing).  
63. See Rachel Ehrenfeld & John Wood, How Terrorists Send Money, 
UNITED PRESS INT’L, http:// www. spacewar. com/ reports/ 
How_Terrorists_Send_Money_999.html. 
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money[,]” when these m-payments are used.64 This gives terrorists and 
illicit financiers a remarkable advantage.65 Technological 
advancements have made constricting the channels of illicit banking 
increasingly difficult. Take for example, mobile payment systems.66 
Recently, Square, a mobile payment aggregator, released a product 
called Square Cash.67 The technology allows users to seamlessly 
transfer money using an app or email.68 While still requiring a debit 
card, no further information is needed.69 While mobile payment 
systems70 “M-payment” is not new, it is presenting additional 
challenges to governments, regulators, law enforcement, as well as the 
M-payment industry in regards to delivering a safe payment system 
while limiting the threat of money laundering, and criminal/terrorist 
activity.71 In March of 2008, the U.S. Department of State issued a 
statement detailing mobile payments and their increased threat for 
 
64. See Bureau of Int’l Narcotics & Law Enforcement Aff., Mobile 
Payments—A Growing Threat, U.S. STATE DEP’T (Mar. 2008), 
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2008/vol2/html/101346.htm 
[hereinafter Int’l Narcotics Control Strat. Rep.]. For a further 
explanation of “m-payments” see generally H. Paul Leyva, J.D., M-
Payment: A Threat to Anti-Money Laundering, VT. B.J., Fall 2008, at 
62, 63 
65. Int’l Narcotics Control Strat. Rep., supra note 64 ; see also Angela 
Angelovska-Wilson; Jaimie, Feltault, M-Payments: The Next Payment 
Frontier—Current Developments and Challenges in International 
Implementation of M-Payments, 8 J. INT’L BANK. L. & REG. 575, 575-93 
(2007) (detailing m-payments) 
66. See e.g. Salvador Rodriguez, Square Cash for Sending Money: How It 
Stacks Up Against Rivals, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2013), http:// 
www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-square-cash-comparison-
20131016,0,2453599.story#axzz2kIKLJTBg (showcasing various mobile 
payment systems).  
67. Square is a merchant services aggregator—also known as purchase 
aggregator—and mobile payment software developer and hardware 
producer. Square’s products are used in a range of small to midsize 
boutiques. For more information on Square and its products, see 
SQUARE, https://squareup.com.  
68. Id. 
69. Int’l Narcotics Control Strat. Rep., supra note 64. 
70. Jenni Hesterman, Mobile Payments a New Way for Terrorists and 
Criminals to Move Money, IN HOMELAND SECURITY (Aug. 27, 2008), 
http://inhomelandsecurity.com/mobile_payments_a_new_way_for/ 
(defining mobile payments or m-payments as “point-of-sale cash 
transactions made through a mobile device such as cell phone or 
personal data assistant.”). 
71. See John A. Cassara, How M-Payments Might Be the Global Miney 
Laundering Machine of Criminals’ Dreams, SAS (Jun. 17, 2013), 
http://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/articles/risk-fraud/m-payments-
machine-criminals-dreams.html. 
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terror activity.72 It is estimated that the remittances of global mobile 
payment exceed two hundred and fifty billion dollars annually.73 With 
the prevalence of these mobile payment systems, proceeds of crime or 
contributions to terrorist organizations can now be transmitted via 
mobile or wireless networks. Due to these transfers, nefarious groups 
and individuals avoid the risk of physical cash movement, thus 
bypassing financial reporting requirements, and gaining an advantage 
via the swift remittance of currency across a country or around the 
world.74 
b. Earning Money 
To fund the activities of a terror organization, money comes from 
a variety of avenues.75 Three leading categories are front companies, 
charities, and illegal activity.76 Front companies are legitimate 
business owned and operated for legitimate purposes, but their 
proprietors or investors often are nefarious individuals.77 Charities at 
one point were the largest source of terrorist funding and the “funds 
transferred to terrorists are often raised legally and only acquire their 
relationship to terrorist financing through subsequent money 
laundering.”78 In the Islamic world alone there are thousands of 
charities, though it is estimated the funding is channeled through a 
few hundred.79 Many terror organizations raise funds with the express 
intent of supporting terrorists; while others seek to promote their 
religion – Islam – through legitimate programs, but are coopted by 
jihadists who subsequently consume the funds to promote their own 
radical cause.80 Further illustrating this point is the case of Holy Land 
Foundation for Relief and Development.81 In July of 2004, the U.S. 
 
72. Int’l Narcotics Control Strat. Rep., supra note 64. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. See Eben Kaplan, Tracking Down Terrorist Financing, COUNCIL FOR. 
REL. (Apr. 4, 2006), http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-financing/tracking-
down-terrorist-financing/p10356. 
76. Id. 
77. See id. at 2 (explaining how Osama Bin Laden allegedly owned a “string 
of retail honey shops throughout the Middle East and Pakistan” which, 
among selling honey, was “used to conceal shipments of money and 
weapons.”); see also WEISS, supra note 23, at 3.  
78. WEISS, supra note 23 at 3. see also Kaplan, supra note 75, at 2. 
79. Kaplan, supra note 75 at 2. 
80. Id. 
81. See United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2011), as revised 
(Dec. 27, 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 525, 184 L. Ed. 2d 338 (U.S. 
2012) and cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 525 (U.S. 2012) 
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government indicted Holy Land Foundation for Relief and 
Development, the largest Muslim charity in the United States, for 
providing financial support to Hamas.82 Its leaders were accused of 
materially supporting a FTO, among other charges.83 The charity’s 
assets were frozen shortly after the 9/11 attacks.84 Allegedly, over $57 
million in donations had been sent to “Hamas-controlled organizations 
and programs in the West Bank and Gaza.” Further substantiating 
the naivety upon donors, the charities donors asserted a lack of 
knowledge as to the claim that their contributions were being diverted 
to terrorism. 
C. Terrorism and Counterfeit Medicine 
One of the principal features in the U.S. War On Terror 
(“WOT”) is the Joint Terrorism Task Force (“JTTF”). This “Task 
Force” is a fairly recent phenomenon where the FBI and participating 
agencies act in concert to either thwart attacks or solve cases.85 The 
JTTF, is comprised of over 682 State, Federal, and Local agencies.86 
In 2006, a Joint Terrorism Task Force (“JTTF”) indicted nineteen 
individuals in Detroit that were tied to a cartel whose principal 
purpose was fundraising for the Lebanese terrorist organization 
Hizballah.87 Historically, much of the focus for these cartels has been 
linked to cigarettes88 and other goods.89 Similarly, in 2010, Lebanese 
police uncovered a medical counterfeiting operation in Lebanon, run 
by Hizballah.90 It is estimated that from this cartel alone, over “10 
 
82. See Laurence Arnold, Holy Land, a Muslim Charity, Accused of Aiding 
Terror, BLOOMBERG, http:// www. bloomberg. com/ apps/ 
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aXJstxtVhcZ8 (July 27, 2004). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. See The Joint Terrorism Task Force andNational Joint Terrorism Task 
Force, NJTTF, http://www. gwumc. edu/ hspi/ policy/ 
NJTTF%20Outreach%20Brief.pdf. 
86. For a detailed list see Id. at p. 10. 
87. See Nineteen Charged With Racketeering to Support Terrorist 
Organization, PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 29, 2006), http://www.prnewswire. 
com/news-releases/nineteen-charged-with-racketeering-to-support-
terrorist-organization-70737752.html. 
88. Id. See also United States v. Hammoud, 483 F. App’x 865, 866 (4th Cir. 
2012) (sentencing Hammoud to 155 years for selling contraband 
cigarettes and providing the windfall of such to Hezbollah.) 
89. See Jay Fraser, Counterfeiting—A Matter of National Security, CTR. 
FOR THREAT AWARENESS THREAT WATCH (May 12, 2008), http:// 
threatswatch.org/rapidrecon/2008/05/counterfeiting-a-matter-of-nat/.  
90. Missing Peace, supra note 2. 
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tons of hazardous pills” have flooded the market, and Hizballah has 
benefitted in the range of “hundreds of millions of dollars.”91  
“Illegal drug trafficking and terrorism cannot be viewed as a 
victimless crime.”92 In South America, despite decade’s worth of 
attempts to thwart its growth, “the production and trafficking of 
popular illicit drugs—cocaine, marijuana, opiates, and 
methamphetamine” creates a multi-billion dollar illicit market.93 
Amongst the facilitation, promulgation, and production of illegal 
drugs and their use, these markets, and the cartels within, create the 
nexus of fragile States, and lead to the growth of corrupt governments 
and officials.94 Many of these South American cartels are described as 
the “greatest organized crime threat to the United States.”95 Many of 
these organizations can, on their own facet, be labeled terrorists.96 For 
example, FARC, and Sendero Luminosos contain paramilitary wings 
that create havoc and chaos amongst their countries, villages, and 
farmers within.97 Additionally, “[s]ome traffickers based in the tri-
border area have ties to radical Islamic terrorist groups such as 
Hizballah.”98 
Prior to September 11th, few Americans realized the connection 
between drug money and how it has been used to fund terrorism.99 
Besides the obvious concerns of illicit drug trading, narco-terror, and 
traditional terror organizations forming relationships in Latin America 
pose numerous risks to the United States as well as the globe. One 
 
91. Id. 
92. See Press Release, Department of Justice, DEA and Giuliani Open 
National Museum Exhibit on Drugs and Terrorism (September 3, 2002) 
available at http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr090302p.html 
93. See CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE ET AL., LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
CARIBBEAN: ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING AND U.S. COUNTERDRUG 
PROGRAMS at 1, available at http://assets.opencrs.com/ rpts/ 
R41215_20100430.pdf 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. For the purpose of this Note, terrorism shall follow the definition set by 
Congress for the Secretary of State when preparing the annual country 
reports on terrorism: “premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or 
clandestine agents.” 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2004). 
97. SEELKE, supra note 93 at 5. 
98. Edwin Mora, Hezbollah, Hamas Raise Money for ‘Terrorist Activities’ 
From Drug Trade in South America, Congressional Research Service 
Says, CNSNEWS.COM (Jun. 8, 2010), http://cnsnews.com/node/67377. 
99. Fraser, supra note 89. 
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such example is the possibility of terrorists being smuggled in via the 
Mexican border.100 
III. Current Framework of Counterfeit Medicine 
In the United States, numerous agencies act both in unison and 
on their own volition to combat counterfeit medicine. While these 
agencies act to thwart, and prevent the dissemination of counterfeit 
medicine, they also act to promulgate information.101 One pitfall of a 
concert of agencies acting is that “[t]he ‘data’ begins to resemble a 
house of mirrors as each group cites the other as the source of the 
information.”102 Before exploring the various levels of action, some 
background information is needed. According to the WHO, 
counterfeit medicine accounts for nearly 10% of readily available 
medicine.103 One staggering statistic, promulgated by the WHO, posits 
$32 billion annual estimated revenue from counterfeit medicines  
100. See Feds Warn Of Terrorists Sneaking Into U.S. Through Mexico, JUD. 
WATCH BLOG (May 8, 2010), http://www.judicialwatch.org/ 
blog/2010/05/feds-warn-terrorists-sneaking-through-mexico/ (confirming 
that an Al Qaeda terrorist is planning to sneak into the U.S. through 
Mexico, and furthering previous statements that Islamic terrorist and 
Mexican drug cartels are teaming up to finance terror in the Middle 
East and perpetrate attacks against America); see also Joe Wolverton 
II, Terrorist Smuggling Into U.S. a Real Concern, NEW AMERICAN (Jul. 
30, 2010), http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/crime/item/5961-
terrorist-smuggling-into-us-a-real-concern (confirming “that aliens with 
ties to Hezbollah, Hamas, and al-Qaeda have been arrested by local law 
enforcement and Border Patrol agents while attempting to cross into” 
Texas). 
101. For example, the FDA and other organizations have online bulletins 
listing drugs that are currently recalled or banned, as well as issue Press 
Releases stating similar findings. See generally Recalls, Market 
Withdrawals, and Safety Alerts, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 30, 
2015), http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/ (providing information on 
all drugs with safety concerns and the reasons for the recalls). 
102. See Kevin Outterson & Ryan Smith, Counterfeit Drugs: The Good, the 
Bad and the Ugly, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 525, 528 (2006) 
103. See World Health Org., Fact Sheet No. 275, Substandard and 
Counterfeit Medicines (Nov. 2003), available at http:// 
www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/2003/fs275/ (reporting that the 
FDA estimates that 10% of the global medicine market is made up of 
counterfeits [hereinafter WHO 275]; see also Press Release, Int’l Council 
of Nurses, Nurses Raise the Alarm: Counterfeit Medicines Kill (May 11, 
2005), available at http://www.icn.ch/PR09_05.htm [hereinafter Nurses 
Raise the Alarm]; see also Press Release, World Health Organization, 
WHO and Partners Accelerate Fight Against Counterfeit Medicines, 
available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2006/ 
pr69/en/ [hereinafter WHO Counterfeit Medicine Press Release] 
(claiming “Up to 50% of medicines sold through rogue web sites are 
fake.”). 
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globally.104 Further promoting this “house of mirrors”105 attitude is the 
problem wherein the FDA cites to the WHO numbers.106 In 2008, a 
publication by the International Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association indicated counterfeit drugs represent a loss 
of over $6 billion in sales per annum.107 Considering the enormous loss 
in sales, combined with the amount of money these illegal 
manufacturers are making, foreign and domestic initiatives are 
currently in place to stymie both the manufacturing processes as well 
as the distribution channels. Domestically, the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”), Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), 
and the Office of the United States Trade Representative in concert 
with private pharmaceutical companies, lead the charge. 
Internationally, the WHO and its subsidiary IMPACT attempt to 
obstruct the dissemination of these illicit counterfeit pharmaceuticals.  
A. Domestic Impediments to Counterfeit Medicine 
The United States, due in part to housing fifty-percent of the 
world’s leading pharmaceutical companies, is extremely rigorous in 
their prevention of counterfeit pharmaceuticals.108 Led in part by the 
U.S.’s strong intellectual property (“IP”) protection, the first defense 
against IP infringement is the USTR.109 Meanwhile, one facet of the 
FDA’s mission is, in regards to drugs, medical devices, foods, blood 
and biological products, to investigate counterfeiting.110 Finally, in so 
far as public impediments are concerned, the FBI and U.S. Customs 
 
104. WHO Counterfeit Medicine Press Release, supra note 103.  
105. Outterson & Smith, supra note 102, at 528. 
106. Compare e.g., Counterfeit Drugs Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/counterfeit/qa.html 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (“It is estimated that upwards of 10% of 
drugs worldwide are counterfeit, and in some countries more than 50% 
of the drug supply is made up of counterfeit drugs.”), with WHO Fact 
Sheet, supra note 103 (“[E]stimates put counterfeits at more than 10% 
of the global medicines market.... In some countries, the figure [of 
counterfeit medicines consumed in developing countries] is thought to be 
as high as 50%.”). 
107. Office of The Coordinator For Counterterrorism, supra note 8 
108. See Rinu Chacko, Top 10 World’s Largest Pharmaceutical Companies 
2013, LIST DOSE (Jun. 29, 2013), http://listdose.com/top-10-worlds-
largest-pharmaceutical-companies-2013/.  
109. See U.S. TRADE REP., http:// www.ustr.gov (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
The USTR consults closely with the United States Congress in 
determining its priorities and strategies and consults with the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) to effect this change. 
110. See Maria Nelson et. al., Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals: A Worldwide 
Problem, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 1068, 1076 (2006) 
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and Border Protection (CBP) contribute in obstructing drug imports 
at U.S. borders and within the country.111  
1. The USTR and Counterfeit Medicine 
One of the USTR’s most significant tools is the Special 301 
Report, which allows the USTSR to issue an annual report specifying 
countries that deny effective protection of IP rights or deny access to 
information regarding IP rights.112 The power to issue this 301 Report 
is conferred unto the USTR by Congress.113 In order to provide the 
most effective guidance, the USTR designates the most egregious 
offenders as “priority” countries.114 Under the Act, “priority” is 
defined as: 
[T]hose foreign countries - (A) that have the most onerous or 
egregious acts, policies, or practices that (i) deny adequate and 
effective intellectual property rights, or (ii) deny fair and 
equitable market access to United States persons that rely upon 
intellectual property protection, (B) whose acts, policies, or 
practices described in subparagraph (A) have the greatest 
adverse impact (actual or potential) on the relevant United 
States products, and (C) that are not (i) entering into good 
faith negotiations, or (ii) making significant progress in bilateral 
or multilateral negotiations to provide adequate and effective 
protection of intellectual property rights.115 
This designation is particularly important as being designated a 
priority “warns a country of U.S. concerns and also warns companies 
based in the United States, or other developed countries that intend 
to do business abroad, that their intellectual property rights are not 
likely to be satisfactorily protected.”116 Additionally, a label of priority 
is used to pressure non-complying countries to adopt stricter IP 
 
111. Id. 
112. See The Work of USTR, Intellectual Property, U.S. TRADE REP. (Jul. 8, 
2004), http://www.ustr.gov/ Trade_Sectors/ Intellectual_Property/ 
The_Work_ of_USTR_-_Intellectual_Property.html. 
113. For more information see generally 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (stating that the 
USTR must by April 30 of each year: “identify (1) those foreign 
countries that (A) deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual 
property rights, or (B) deny fair and equitable markets access to United 
States persons that rely upon intellectual property protection, and (2) 
those foreign countries identified under paragraph (1) that are 
determined by the Trade Representative to be priority foreign 
countries.”) 
114. Id. 
115. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b). 
116. Nelson, supra note 110, at 1075. 
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protection, and ultimately compliance with the USTR’s goals.117 
Another program the USTR has instituted to thwart counterfeiting is 
the “Strategy Targeting Organized Piracy” (or “STOP!”) Initiative.118 
Under STOP!, the USTR works to dismantle criminal enterprises that 
steal IP by empowering law enforcement authorities (FBI, Police, U.S. 
Attorneys, District Attorneys) to arrest and prosecute offenders.119  
As mentioned previously, the work of the USTR is just one aspect 
in a multi-faceted domestic approach to thwart counterfeit medicine, 
and ultimately terrorism via counterfeit medicine.  
2. The FDA and Counterfeit Medicine 
Responding to the evolving problem of counterfeit drugs, the 
FDA created a mechanism for thwarting counterfeiting – the result 
was the creation of an FDA Counterfeit Drug Task Force.120 Through 
the FDA’s Office of Criminal Investigations, the FDA has taken a 
proactive stance on identifying the component suppliers thereby 
availing themselves the opportunity to seize the counterfeit drugs 
prior to their reaching consumers.121 The FDA estimates that for 
every dollar a consumer spends, twenty-five cents are investigated by 
the FDA-OCI.122 Recently, the FDA proposed new measures to 
protect the nation’s food supply.123 These rules stem from the Food 
 
117. See generally Eric H. Smith, Copyright Industries Urge Greater Global 
Protection of American Jobs and Exports Threatened by Piracy, INT’L 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.iipa.com/ 
pdf/IIPASpecial3012010SubmissionPressReleaseFinal011810.pdf.  
118. See STOP Initiative Targets Piracy, Counterfeit Trade, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE (Oct. 4, 2004), http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2004/Oct/05-
501889.html; see also Trade Remedy Investigations, U.S. INT’L TRADE 
COMM., http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/int_prop/index.htm (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2014). 
119. STOP Initiative, supra note 118. 
120. See FDA, COMBATING COUNTERFEIT DRUGS 2 (2004), available at 
http:// www.fda.gov/counterfeit/. 
121. See Combating Counterfeit Drugs: A Report of The Food and Drug 
Administration Annual Update, U.S. FOOD & DRUG. ADMIN. (May 18, 
2005), http:// www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/counterfeit/update2005.html. 
For more information on where the FDA derives its investigative power 
see 18 U.S.C. § 1518 (1996), 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2013), 18 U.S.C. § 2320 
(2012). 
122. See Inspections, Compliance, Enforcement, and Criminal Investigations, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/ 
ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/ucm123062.htm.  
123. See Focused Mitigation Strategies To Protect Food Against Intentional 
Adulteration, FED. REG., https://www.federalregister.gov/ articles/ 
2013/12/24/2013-30373/focused-mitigation-strategies-to-protect-food-
against-intentional-adulteration; see also Lynne Terry, FDA Proposes 
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Safety Modernization Act that President Obama signed in 2011.124 Its 
purpose is to in part, require large food plants to have a defense plan 
to protect vulnerabilities in their processing apparatus.125 This is 
significant as this protects against an area in which terrorists can 
assault vis-á-vis attacking the general populous.  
3. The FBI and U.S. Customs and Counterfeit Medicine 
Switching from regulatory and supply constraints to a more active 
and engaged role yields the actions of the FBI and U.S. Customs and 
Border Patrol (“CBP”). In regards to the CBP, their role in 
preventing counterfeit medicine, and terrorism, is attempting to 
thwart wrongdoers at the border. One way CBP thwarts wrongdoers 
is by analyzing all shipments for copyright/trademarks. By requiring 
this recordation, in conjunction with U.S. law, which requires owners 
of copyrights and trademarks record their rights, CBP officials can 
seize pirated or counterfeit goods at the borders.126 While CBP is 
charged with preventing smuggling at the border, once these nefarious 
counterfeit products have entered the country the FBI is charged with 
sourcing them, and arresting the individuals involved.127 In this 
capacity, their mission is to protect the public from the threat of 
these fake medications.128 In their joint task force responsibilities, the 
FBI works closely with the WTO, FDA, and others, which has 
allegedly yielded a deterrent effect regarding the exploitation of 
counterfeit pharmaceuticals. In addition to working with foreign 
services, the FBI also works closely with local, and international, law 
enforcement to thwart would be criminals.129 
 
Food Safety Rule to Thwart Terrorism, OR. LIVE (Dec. 20, 2013), 
http://www.oregonlive.com/health/index.ssf/2013/12/fda_proposed_fo
od_safety_rule.html.  
124. See generally 21 U.S.C §§ 301–399. 
125. Terry, supra note 123. 
126. See 19 C.F.R. § 133.1 et seq., Customs Duties; Bureau of Customs and 
Border Protection, Dep’t of Homeland Security; Dep’t of the Treasury; 
Trademarks, Trade Names, and Copyrights. 19 C.F.R. § 133.22, 
Restrictions on importation of articles bearing copying or simulating 
trademarks, subsection (b), for instance, allows for denial of entry of any 
“articles of foreign or domestic manufacture imported into the United 
States bearing a mark or name copying or simulating a recorded mark 
or name” (emphasis added). 
127. See ALBERT L. WERTHEIMER ET. AL, COUNTERFEIT MEDICINES: POLICY, 
ECONOMICS, AND COUNTERMEASURES 61 (2012).  
128. Id. 
129. See Press Release, FBI, Two Pakistani Nationals Indicted for 
Conspiring to Illegally Ship Pharmaceuticals into the U.S. (Nov. 7, 
2012) http://www.fbi.gov/ washingtondc/ press-releases/ 2012/two-
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015) 
War Through Pharmaceuticals 
364 
From the comprehensive analysis above, it appears the U.S. has 
an elaborate grasp on the counterfeit medicine problem. In reality, 
while the structure seems stable and concrete, it fails to address the 
more pressing issue – preventing the production and exploitation of 
counterfeit pharmaceuticals by international terror organizations.  
IV. Critique of Current Framework of Counterfeit 
Medicine and Solution 
While the United States and International partners theoretically 
have an elaborate network of processes and agencies designed to 
prevent the promulgation of counterfeit pharmaceuticals, the reality is 
that most of the work occurs on U.S. soil. Though this ultimately 
protects the end-user, it fails to eradicate the source. Another key 
dilemma is the lack of a true coordinated effort to thwart this process. 
INTERPOL, IMPACT, FDA, and FBI task forces liaise between one 
another – which purportedly yields the sharing of data and vital 
mission planning. Until the U.S. and the rest of the world rid the 
“house of mirrors” concern, the prevention of the War Through 
Pharmaceuticals will continue to vastly lag behind the War on 
Terror. In this section, this Note will propose a solution to help fix 
this difficulty. 
The international community, through a coordinated effort, can 
effectively prevent the dissemination of counterfeit pharmaceuticals. 
This proposal features two interdependent facets – an international 
task force, and an international database – that, in unison create an 
extremely effective solution to an extremely expensive and dangerous 
problem.130 
A. International Task Force 
One of the key difficulties surrounding IMPACT, and other 
international solutions, is the absence of a true enforcement 
apparatus.131 In the United States, and many countries around the 
 
pakistani-nationals-indicted-for-conspiring-to-illegally-ship-
pharmaceuticals-into-the-u.s 
130. SEELKE, supra note 93, at 1. 
131. See George F. Will, Opinion, The Perils of “Legality,” NEWSWEEK, 
Sept. 10, 1990, at 66 (exclaiming “[i]f international law is really law, 
who enacts, construes, adjudicates and enforces it? The phrase 
“international law” often is virtually an oxymoron. Law without a sword 
is mere words: lacking an enforcement mechanism soi-disant  “law” is 
merely admonition or aspiration. Law must be backed by coercion 
legitimatized by a political process.”) Cf. James G. Apple, Enforcement 
Of International Law Is Not Dependent On A “Sword” Or Enforcement 
Mechanism, AM. SOCIETY INT’L L. & INT’L JUD. ACAD. (2007) 
http://www.judicialmonitor.org/archive_0207/generalprinciples.html.  
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world, laws are obeyed because failure to abide leads to penalty—
typically arrest or in the case of civil violations, fines; while 
internationally there is the pressure of the international community to 
contemplate, which may on its own pose a great enough stigma to 
deter behavior.132 Unfortunately, IMPACT, in its current formation, 
merely acts in an advisory manner.133 Through IMPACT’s 
coordinated networks, agencies, in theory, act as one. The problem 
tends to be a lack of systematic coordination. While IMPACT and its 
partners’ actions produce interception of contraband, they are not 
proactive in attacking or raiding the sites where terrorists harvest and 
make the counterfeits.134 This Note focuses on the creation of an 
international Taskforce to seek out and prevent the terrorists from 
either attacking pharmaceutical production, or producing counterfeits 
before they are shipped. This Note is not meant as a scathing critique 
of IMPACT, but merely a renovation of a stable foundation, that if 
implemented, will yield to greater results in preventing terrorists from 
producing counterfeit medicine.  
In order to effectively staff this standing task force, the United 
Nations Security Council must authorize the action.135 While there 
will invariably be some dissent, due to the severe nature of this 
problem, all countries will ultimately agree this is necessary.136 One of 
the principal cornerstones of the United Nations is international 
 
132. See generally 2013 USSC GUIDELINES MANUAL, http://www.ussc.gov/ 
Guidelines/2013_Guidelines/index.cfm (detailing all the federal 
sentencing guidelines and their rationales). 
133. See IMPACT, supra note 5. 
134. See BRIAN D. FINLEY, COUNTERFEIT DRUGS AND NATIONAL SECURITY 12 
(2011) (stating that “[g]overnments should be more proactive… from a 
public health perspective, as well as from a national security 
standpoint.”). 
135. See U.N. Charter art. 41; see also, e.g., Preparatory Process to Develop 
the Terms of Reference for the UN Interagency Task Force on NCDs, 
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Dec. 2011), http://www.who.int/ nmh/events/ 
ncd_task_force/en/ and Press Release, World Health Org., UN to 
Establish WHO-led Interagency Task Force on the Prevention and 
Control of NCDs (22 July, 2013), available at http://www.who.int/ 
mediacentre/news/notes/2013/ncds_ecosoc_20130722/en/ (discussing 
the United Nations establishing a joint task force on the Prevention and 
Control of NCDs.) 
136. See Michelle Nichols, Russia, China veto U.N. Security Council 
resolution on Syria, REUTERS (Jul. 19, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2012/07/19/us-syria-crisis-un-idUSBRE86I0UD20120719; see also 
Peter James Spielmann, Russia Holding Security Council ‘Hostage,’ 
Power says, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/ 
news/ world/ 2013/ 09/ 05/ russia-holding-security-council-hostage-
power-says-russia-holding-hostage-syria-power-says/ 
6Ie7i5M0sTlD0dY0SIqLkO/story.html. 
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cooperation.137 The ability to depend on this body of Nations for swift 
and just action has, on numerous occasions, led to a multitude of 
cooperation and resolutions that have not only stymied war, but also 
created new countries, and protected the rights of countless 
unrepresented minorities.138 The proposal calls for a U.N. Security 
Council resolution authorizing the standing use of force for a 
dedicated mission.139 That mission will be the neutralization and 
systematic targeting of terror organizations focused on counterfeiting 
and pharmaceuticals.140  
In theory, this new task force – affectionately labeled the Medical 
Anti-Counterfeiting Task Force (MACT) – will act as an autonomous 
asymmetrical unit. In analogizing this proposed unit, the model will 
be similar to that of the International Anti-Poaching Foundation 
(“IAPF”). The IAPF acts akin to a structured military-like battalion, 
employing modern technology to fend off violent poachers.141 The sole 
mission of the IAPF is to protect wild life reserves in the African from 
 
137. See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3 (stating that the main purposes of the 
United Nations are “international co-operation in solving international 
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character.”).  
138. See e.g. G.A. Res. 67/262, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/262 (May 15, 2013) 
(addressing “The situation in the Syrian Arab Republic.”); see also G.A. 
Res. 47/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/147 (condemning “the [s]ituation of 
human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia”); see also G.A. 
Res. 47/145 & 47/146, U.N. Docs. A/RES/47/145 & A/RES/47/146 
(condemning “the [s]ituation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran” and “the situation of human rights in Iraq.”); see also G.A. Res. 
181(II), U.N. Doc. A/RES/181(II) (Nov. 29, 1947) (recommending “to 
the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all 
other Members of the United Nations the adoption and 
implementation… [of] the Plan of Partition [for Palestine].”).  
139. Under Art. 39 of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council can authorize 
force when they determine “the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and in accordance with Art. 
42 “may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be 
necessary.” See U.N. Charter arts. 39, 42. 
140. Previously, the Security Council has authorized force for use against 
Iraq, among other occasions. See e.g., S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990) (authorizing use of “all necessary means” to 
uphold S.C. Res. 660 demanding Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait, as well 
as numerous subsequent resolutions enacted to ensure the restoration of 
peace within this area) and S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 
3, 1991) (having been cited as recently as 2001 to authorize force against 
Iraq for failure to abide by the conditions precedent).  
141. About the IAPF, INT’L ANTI-POACHING FOUND. http://www.iapf.org/ 
en/about (last visited March 16, 2014). See also Damien Mander, Rise 
of the Drones, AFR. GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 2013), http://www.iapf.org/ 
images/documents/riseofthedronesjan2013.pdf. 
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poachers.142 The IAPF is a remarkable model to analogize this task 
force to, though it is a private non-profit.143 In seeking funding for this 
recommended task force, one possible avenue is a public-private 
model.144 Currently, the WHO estimates that pharmaceutical 
companies lose $75 billion per year due to counterfeit 
pharmaceuticals.145 Though some have security forces to cease illegal 
mills’ production, relinquishing this expenditure to multinational force 
would allow for a more effective handling of the issue, and thus the 
likely possibility that the total loss will drastically be diminished.146 
Much like the IAPF, this taskforce should have both a central 
location, as well as various locations “in theatre.”147 The central 
location should be located on a current military installation (AfriCom 
and CentCom for example) and be pre-loaded with the top Special 
Forces soldiers that countries make available.148 The use of unmanned 
aerial vehicles (“UAV”) can also aide and assist the taskforce.149 In 
 
142. Id. (noting the groups motto is “To protect and preserve wildlife in 
volatile regions.”). 
143. See A Rhino and a Gun, THUMBS UP AFR., http:// www. 
thumbsupafrica.org/program/program-2/iapf.html (last visited March 
14, 2014.)  
144. See Technology Partnership, UNITED NATIONS, http:// www. 
unfoundation.org/what-we-do/campaigns-and-initiatives/mobile-
technology/technology-partnership.html (last visited March 14, 2014) 
(explaining that through the public-private partnership, and donation of 
Ted Turner, mobile technology is able to be given to those in developing 
countries to “play a vital role in developing solutions”). 
145. See Eric Palmer, Top Counterfeit Drug Events in 2012, FIERCEPHARMA 
(October 10, 2012), http://www.fiercepharma.com/special-reports/top-
counterfeit-drug-events-2012. Cf. HEMA VITHLANI, THE ECONOMIC 
IMPACT OF COUNTERFEITING 17 (1997) (estimating that in 1997, 
legitimate losses may be as high as $17 billion). 
146. See Carl Quintanilla, War on Counterfeit Goods, CNBC (Original air 
date: July 14th, 2010.), http://www.cnbc.com/id/37824347/; see e.g., 
LEV RATNOVSKI, COMPETITION POLICY FOR MODERN BANKS 3 (2013) 
(explaining that the IMF is more effective at lending to underdeveloped 
and developing countries [Crisis Lending] than traditional banking 
structures).  
147. English Definition of “Theatre,” CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARIES ONLINE, 
http:// dictionary.cambridge.org/ dictionary/ british/ theatre_4 (last 
visited March 14, 2014).  
148. Besides United States Tier 1 operators, British SAS, German GSG9, 
Polish GROM, and French GIGN soldiers, and veterans, should be 
recruited to carry out these missions. For a more exhaustive list, see 
Top Ten Special Operations Forces in the World, ARMED FORCES 
HISTORY MUSEUM, http://armedforcesmuseum.com/top-ten-special-
operations-forces-in-the-world/ (last visited March 14, 2014).  
149. See Mander, supra note 141. 
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using these asymmetric warfare capabilities, it will give the UN 
taskforce a much-needed advantage over these terror cells harvesting 
and planning on tampering with pharmaceuticals. 150 The benefits and 
advantages of such a task force are numerous, but succinctly, it allows 
for greater outreach and the ability to be proactive in this action 
against counterfeit pharmaceuticals. Much like joint task forces have 
been successful in their various UN uses, these task forces have also 
been beneficial in the war against terror.151  
The efficacy of current task forces provides optimism for the 
effective use of this unit.152 Unlike IMPACT, which acts purely in an 
advisory manner, this task force would work in a preemptive 
manner.153 The addition of this task force does not preclude the use of 
IMPACT, but – much like the spirit of the UN – would be a further 
cooperative angle designed to thwart terrorist organizations from 
producing, marketing, and selling counterfeit medicine.154 Further, 
IMPACT has failed to yield any newsworthy results since Operation 
Pangea, in 2011.155 While commendable, Operation Pangea failed to 
prevent the production and dissemination of these counterfeit 
medicines, but rather – through Internet Service Providers (ISP), and 
Customs Officials – seized the drugs upon their arrival, and shut 
 
150. Id. 
151. See Press Release, United Nations, United Nations-African Union Joint 
Task Force on Peace and Security Holds Third Consultative Meeting in 
New York (Sept. 26, 2011) available at http://www.un.org/ 
News/Press/docs/2011/afr2254.doc.htm; see also JENA BAKER MCNEILL 
ET AL. 39 TERROR PLOTS FOILED SINCE 9/11: EXAMINING 
COUNTERTERRORISM’S SUCCESS STORIES ABSTRACT (2011).  
152. See, e.g., Select Achievements in 2008-2009, U.N. REG. TASK FORCE ON 
INJECTING DRUG USE & HIV/AIDS FOR ASIA & PACIFIC, https://www. 
unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/topics/hiv-and-aids/unrtf.html#4 
(last visited March 14, 2014) (exclaiming the Task Force’s numerous 
accomplishments including: Collaboration and support to legal and 
policy reviews by the HIV/AIDS Asia Regional Program (HAARP) 
supported by AusAID, and Issuance of a document: Step-by-Step 
Algorithm for the Procurement of Controlled Substances for Drug 
Substitution).  
153. See IMPACT, supra note 5. 
154. See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3 (stating that the main purposes of the 
United Nations are “international co-operation in solving international 
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character.”). 
155. See Press Release, Interpol, Global Operation Strikes at Online Supply 
of Illegal and Counterfeit Medicines Worldwide (September 29, 2011) 
available at http://www.interpol.int/ News-and-media/ News/2011/ 
PR081 (stating that through a campaign to prevent the prevalence of 
counterfeit pharmaceuticals being sold online, IMPACT and 
INTERPOL have shut down websites and learned valuable information 
to effectively prevent the sale of counterfeit drugs online.)  
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down the conduits (websites).156 This approach is far from effective, as 
exemplified by the lack of progress since 2011. While a task force is an 
extraordinary improvement from the status quo, it alone will not 
properly facilitate the end of this pandemic. Thus, in addition to the 
newly created task force, IMPACT’s focus will shift to the 
establishment of an international database of pharmaceutical drugs 
currently being counterfeited, the suspected parties involved in the 
operation and identifying where the funding is coming from and being 
diverted. The creation of this database will be used as a guide for 
MACT to pinpoint, with surgical precision, attacks aimed at 
disrupting and terminating this counterfeit production. 
B. International Database, Regulation, and the Adoption of a Treaty 
Making the Production of Counterfeit Medicine a Crime. 
Through IMPACT’s mission statement, its operation is to 
construct coordinated international networks to halt the production, 
and sale of counterfeit medicine.157 While continuing to promulgate 
rules, advisory opinions, and white papers on counterfeit medicine, 
under this proposal, IMPACT will be tasked with compiling, 
maintaining, and promulgating to MACT the database. The purpose 
of this database is to furnish to both MACT as well as the major 
anti-counterfeiting players, a timely database consisting of 
pharmaceutical drugs currently being counterfeited, the suspected 
parties involved in the operation and identifying where the funding is 
coming from and being diverted.158 In theory, this database will be 
similar to United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization’s (UNESCO) International and National databases of 
“Illicit Trafficking of Stolen Property,” or the United Nations Office 
of Drugs and Crime’s Electronic Legal Resources on International 
Terrorism159 The UNESCO Database allows for aggrieved parties to 
report stolen Art – equipped with photos and detailed information of 
the piece – on an Interpol based database.160 In its iteration as an art 
 
156. See id. 
157. See IMPACT, supra note 5. 
158. Id. (explaining that the “players” include “international organizations, 
non-governmental organizations, enforcement agencies, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers associations and drug and regulatory authorities”).  
159. See e.g., Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Property, U.N. ED., SCI. & CULT’L 
ORG., http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/illicit-traffic-of-
cultural-property/databases/ (last visited March 14, 2014). See also 
Electronic Legal Resources on International Terrorism, UNODC, 
https://www.unodc.org/tldb/ (last visited March 14, 2014). 
160. See e.g., Bearded Man, INTERPOL, http:// www.interpol.int/ notice/ 
search/woa/1185172 (last visited March 14, 2014).  
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database, individual countries also have website based databases for 
individuals to report stolen art and seek aide in having it returned.161  
While borrowing the form from UNESCO’s database, 
pharmaceutical companies, as well as national organizations (FBI, 
Masad, local police departments, Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence 
etc.), and international groups (WHO, IMPACT, Interpol) can 
update this database upon their findings.162 Ideally, it would provide a 
form that would allow for key descriptors to be provided. These 
descriptors would items such as: location of seizure, description of pill 
(size, color, legible text or identifying marks), origin, group 
responsible, and suspected location of production facility. In the spirit 
of international cooperation and coordination, this data would be 
securely stored on Interpol’s servers, and transmitted to the task force 
to provide real time updates as to the location of counterfeit 
production. From this, the task force could launch preemptive strikes 
and coordinate with sovereign territories as to how to effectively 
negotiate the jurisdictional boundaries often present in international 
endeavors. Access to submit to the database would be open to 
credentialed individuals, with credentials being made possible after 
proof of affiliation in the aforementioned list of individuals. As 
previously mentioned, administration, and funding would be made 
possible through IMPACT and the WHO’s budget, as well as 
voluntary contributions.163 It would be encouraged for individual 
country’s to have their lead investigative assembly (for example the 
FBI in the United States) have sub-databases at their level where 
users could post and they could vet prior to uploading to the 
international database. While this may seem like a detailed process, 
and in effect it is, it has proven to be of assistance.164 As illustrated on 
 
161. See e.g., L’Office Centrale de Lutte Contre le Trafic des Biens Culturels 
[Central Office for the Fight Against Traffic in Cultural Goods], POLICE 
NATIONALE [FRENCH NATIONAL POLICE] (Dec. 13, 2011), 
http://www.police-nationale.interieur.gouv.fr/Organisation/Direction-
Centrale-de-la-Police-Judiciaire/Lutte-contre-la-criminalite-organisee/ 
Office-central-de-lutte-contre-le-trafic-de-biens-culturels (Fr.); National 
Stolen Art File , FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/ 
vc_majorthefts/arttheft/national-stolen-art-file. 
162. See e.g., Bearded Man, INTERPOL, http://www.interpol.int/ notice/ 
search/woa/1185172 (last visited March 14, 2014). 
163. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., PROGRAMME BUDGET 2012-2013 82–83 (2012) 
[hereinafter WHO Budget], available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/ 
pb/2012-2013/PB_2012–2013_eng.pdf. 
164. See e.g., Recent Restitution Cases of Cultural Objects Using the 1970 
Convention, UNESCO, http:// www. unesco.org/ new/en/culture/ 
themes/illicit-trafficking-of-cultural-property/recent-restitution-cases-of-
cultural-objects-using-the-1970-convention/ (last visited March 14, 
2014).  
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the UNESCO website, there are many cases of individuals, and 
countries, having their lost art returned to them.165  
The next component is increased regulation. IMPACT has already 
undertaken a massive campaign against counterfeit online sales of 
drugs, but this action needs to be further expanded to properly 
account for terrorist organizations.166 Following in the action of the 
Customs and Border Patrol, other countries should place Import 
Alerts on drugs from countries listed in the database.167 Doing so will 
have a multi-faceted effect. First, Import Alerts trigger mandatory 
searching and testing of drugs. Second, this will have an undesirable 
economic effect on the origin country.168 Finally, United States 
Customs and Border Patrol, along with their international 
counterparts, should flag medicine from countries known to harbor, 
produce, and ship counterfeit medicine produced from terrorist 
organizations. By crosschecking with the aforementioned database, a 
wide array of countries can be listed which will yield to further 
descriptors to add to the aforementioned database.169 
The final approach is the creation of a Treaty, which promulgates 
stringent rules and definitions for which countries must abide. As one 
author noted, if a crime amounts to an offence against the 
international community at large, or sans international cooperation 
the crime will further persevere, then said crime should be considered 
an international crime.170 In this situation, it is increasingly apparent 
 
165. See Other Cases of Return or Restitution of Cultural Objects, UNESCO, 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/illicit-trafficking-of-
cultural-property/other-cases-of-return-or-restitution-of-cultural-objects/ 
(last visited March 14, 2014); Recent Restitution Cases of Cultural 
Objects Using the 1970 Convention, UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/ 
new/en/culture/themes/illicit-trafficking-of-cultural-property/recent-
restitution-cases-of-cultural-objects-using-the-1970-convention/(last 
visited March 14, 2014) (explaining that objects both in accordance with 
the 1970 convention, as well as outside the province of that document, 
were returned to their owners).  
166. See Operations, INTERPOL, http:// www. interpol. int/Crime-areas/ 
Pharmaceutical-crime/Operations/Operation-Pangea (last visited March 
14, 2014) (explaining the efficacy of Operation Pangea). 
167. See Import Alert, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http:// www. fda. gov/ 
Forindustry/ ImportProgram/ ImportAlerts/default.htm (last visited 
March 14, 2014) (explaining what Import Alerts are, and allowing for 
access to a current list of Alerts). 
168. See BRYAN A. LIANG, PIGS, DRUGS, AND TERRORISTS 12, http:// 
safemeds.typepad.com/files/pigs-drugs-and-terrorists.pdf (last visited 
March 14, 2014) (explaining that by placing an Import Alert, all drugs 
from that country will be stopped and subject to exhaustive testing).  
169. See supra sec. IV(A)(2).  
170. See M.C. Bassiouni, The Penal Characteristics of International 
Criminal Law, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 27, at 28-29 (1983). 
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that individual countries cannot singlehandedly prosecute offenders, 
thus, it should be considered an international crime.171 Finally, the 
Declaration of Rome held that counterfeiting medicines is “widespread 
and has escalated to such an extent that effective coordination and 
cooperation at the international level are necessary for regional and 
national strategies to be more effective.”172  
As numerous treaties have previously specified international 
crimes, using these prior treaties, and applying them towards 
counterfeit medicine, is a worthwhile cause.173 The first step in 
determining the language of a Treaty would be a consensus on the 
impropriety, followed by a definition of counterfeit medicine.174 Using 
the International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting 
Currency, the following would most likely be accepted as universal 
acts falling under the purview of counterfeit medicine:  
(i) the manufacturing or preparation of counterfeit medicine; 
(ii) the provision or possession of equipment, instruments or 
ingredients used in the manufacturing or preparation of 
counterfeit medicine; 
(iii) the sale, offering for sale, dispatch, transportation, and 
import or export of counterfeit medicine, or equipment or 
ingredients used in the manufacturing or preparation of 
counterfeit medicine; 
(iv) the falsification of documents in relation to a counterfeit 
medicine or its ingredients; 
 
171. See Amir Attaran et al., Why and How to Make an International Crime 
of Medicine Counterfeiting, 9 J INT’L CRIM. JUST. 325, 327 (2011).  
172. See Declaration of Rome, Conclusions and Recommendations of the 
WHO International Conference on Combating Counterfeit Medicines, at 
Section 4, available at http://www.who.int/medicines/ services/ 
counterfeit/RomeDeclaration.pdf (last visited March 14, 2014) 
(declaring, inter alia, “Counterfeiting medicines… is a vile and serious 
criminal offence; Combating counterfeit medicines requires the 
coordinated effort of all the different public and private stakeholders; 
[and] Counterfeiting medicines is widespread and has escalated to such 
an extent that effective coordination and cooperation at the 
international level are necessary for regional and national strategies to 
be more effective.”). 
173. See e.g., Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of 
Aircraft, 860 UNTS 105; (delineating hijacking aircraft as an 
international crime). See also Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs, 
520 UNTS 204; as amended by the Protocol Amending the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 976 UNTS 3; (demarcating trafficking 
narcotics as an international crime). See also International Convention 
against the Taking of Hostages, UN Doc. A/34/46 (1979).  
174. Attaran et al., supra note 171, at 334–35. 
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(v) the entering into a conspiracy to commit, or the making of 
an attempt to commit, or the aiding, abetting, facilitating, or 
counseling to commit, any of the foregoing offences.175 
The final element in drafting the Treaty is the inclusion of mens 
rea or intent. While many laws specifically articulate the culpable 
intent, in this case—as all of the elements deal with counterfeit 
medicine—it may be more prudent to include the mens rea 
requirement in the definition.176 Regarding the definition of counterfeit 
medicine, in keeping with the prior used definition – promulgated by 
the WHO, but with slight modification for mens rea – for the purpose 
of the Treaty shall be: “fake medicine[, that] may be contaminated or 
contain the wrong or no active ingredient,” which is intentionally 
mislabeled or knowingly identified as that unto which it is not.177 The 
Treaty will undoubtedly face scrutiny from member-nations in 
approving and ratifying the law in their nation, but as explained 
previously, the Treaty merely adopts pre-existing language, and crafts 
it for counterfeit medicine, thus alleviating some of the concern many 
member-nations may have.178  
IV. Conclusion 
The issue of counterfeit medicine has surpassed the ability to 
contain, and yields an immensely profitable result for terrorists.179 
Terror organizations have eclipsed the age of narcotic smuggling, and 
traditional financing, and have transcended in to an era of 
sophisticated counterfeit medicine trafficking to gain an advantage 
over authorities and groups looking to obstruct them.180 The WHO 
estimates counterfeit medicine has surpassed a $75 billion industry, in 
which some is directed towards terror organizations bank accounts.181 
While the international community has known about this problem for 
some time, an effective solution – until now – has yet to be proposed, 
or enacted. When countries on their own cannot enact change, it 
should be the responsibility of the internationally community to act, 
in concert, and provide what the singular country cannot.  
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In proposing, and evaluating a solution, this Note examined the 
actions of two groups – Hizballah, and the Real IRA – and exposed 
the lesser known counterfeit medicine production that they have 
previously and, in some cases, continue to employ to raise their funds. 
Next, an analysis of the complex issue of terror financing was 
explored. In examining how terrorist organizations fundraise, several 
methods are employed to raise funds that traditionally, were much 
easier to procure.182 Of the most common, charities are no longer the 
easiest method for terror organizations to traffic illicit money into for 
their activity.183 In the last decade, nearly $200 million in terrorist 
funds were seized or frozen, and the U.S., in concert with 36 other 
countries, organized the Financial Action Task Force on Money 
Laundering (“FATF”) to further combat terrorist organizations from 
laundering their criminal gains.184 Countries such as the United States, 
have attempted to take action via domestic agencies such as the 
FDA, FBI, and the JTTF. While their effort should be commended, 
this effort fails to actively disrupt an activity that has the possibility 
to kill millions.185 In the international community, little has been done 
– once again – to proactively seek or disrupt these production 
facilities.186 While white papers have been written, and missions have 
been waged against online retailers and at Customs offices, a 
systematic failure to be proactive has led to the rise of an industry 
that has been condoned by religious zealots and their leaders for use 
only on Western infidels, and non-Shiite believers.187 The only way to 
truly neutralize terrorist organizations from producing counterfeit 
medicine, and thus funding their illicit activity, is a proactive task-
force melded with a world-wide, constantly updated database, and an 
international treaty providing countries and their courts with the 
authority to strike, seize, and sentence infringing individuals for their 
offenses. A properly produced a task-force should be molded after the 
IAPF in that it should consist of special forces soldiers, trained in 
asymmetric warfare and advanced combat techniques.188 The 
accompanying database should be modeled after the UNESCO Art 
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databases for both ease of use, and effectiveness.189 Allowing 
governmental agencies, international organizations, and non-
governmental agencies to upload their findings to the database, 
provides the task-force instant feedback on the location, terrorist 
organization, and magnitude of their operation. IMPACT, through 
their WHO mandate shall be responsible for operating and ensuring 
proper connectivity with Interpol and their servers. In furthering the 
global knowledge of counterfeit medicine and specific drugs’ 
whereabouts, Customs officials should produce an Import Alert on all 
items from countries known to harbor production facilities for 
counterfeit medicine.190 Finally, to assist the international community 
in prosecuting these terrorists, a Treaty should be adopted, which 
both sets out the elements of the crime for producing counterfeit 
medicine, and also defines what counterfeit medicine is.191 Effectively 
setting forth these four principles, this Note proposes a solution, 
which should both garner the support of the international community, 
and frustrate the uncivilized attacks of terrorist organizations by 
disrupting their financing regimes.  
“Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international 
behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective 
retribution.” – Ronald Reagan.192  
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